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Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and 
the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech
Clay Calvert*
When the Supreme Court steps up to the plate in a case like Matal 
v. Tam involving free-speech protection of offensive expression, the 
justices have options about just how hard to swing the judicial bat.1 
First Amendment advocates, of course, hope they’ll swing for the 
fences and crush free-expression grand slams. Cohen v. California, 
protecting the display of an offensive jacket in a courthouse cor-
ridor and propelled by memorable lines like “one man’s vulgarity 
is another’s lyric,” was one such home run, soaring over a dissent 
and past the outfield wall of censorship.2 Other times, the Court 
merely drops a bunt and barely advances the First Amendment 
score, if at all. 
In Tam, the Supreme Court threw out the “disparagement clause” 
of the Lanham Act, the federal trademark law, because trademarks 
are private speech and thus regulating them based on government 
determinations of offensiveness violates the First Amendment. The 
solid outcome here—a virtual triple, as described later—contrasts 
with the narrow, incremental results in some other recent First 
Amendment cases that reached the Court. 
* Professor & Joseph L. Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and 
Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of 
Florida. Also part of the Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute and a Basket of Deplor-
able People and Orgs. in Support of Petitioner, Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293. Note that PTO 
Director Michelle Lee resigned shortly before the case was decided, with Joseph Matal 
now serving as acting director, so Lee v. Tam became Matal v. Tam.
1  Admittedly, a baseball analogy featuring the Court batting strikes out against 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s testimony during his confirmation hearings that “it’s my 
job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.” Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, 
Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases with ‘Open Mind,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2015, at A1.
2  403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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Consider Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, a case regarding fleeting expletives and momentary nudity 
on broadcast television.3 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
score two runs for the First Amendment—to abolish the FCC’s reg-
ulatory authority over broadcast indecency (thereby reversing the 
aging 1978 Pacifica decision arising from the George Carlin filthy-
words case4) and to strike down its definition of indecency as uncon-
stitutionally vague. But the Court waved off both pitches. 
Instead, it resolved the case “on fair notice grounds under the Due 
Process Clause.”5 The Court determined that the FCC had impermissibly 
changed its indecency policy to target fleeting expletives and isolated 
sexual images without giving networks Fox and ABC proper notice of 
the switch. As for the free speech issue, the Court simply reminded the 
FCC—perhaps with an eyebrow arched—that the commission should 
feel “free to modify its current indecency policy in light of its determi-
nation of the public interest and applicable legal requirements.”6 
Did the FCC heed that suggestion? No. Although it put out a notice 
for public comment about its indecency policy shortly thereafter and 
said it would target only egregious indecency incidents,7 it failed to 
take substantive action. Today, the FCC’s indecency policy remains 
what it was when the Court decided Fox Television Stations five years 
ago. The First Amendment issues are left waiting for another day 
and another case, perhaps the product of Chief Justice John Roberts’s 
general penchant for minimalism and avoidance.8 
Or take—with more relevance, as it happens, for Tam—the Court’s 
2015 decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.9 
3  567 U.S. 239 (2012).
4  Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
5  Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 258.
6  Id. at 259.
7  See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Reduces Backlog of 
Broadcast Indecency Complaints by 70% (More Than One Million Complaints); Seeks 
Comment on Adopting Egregious Cases Policy (Apr. 1, 2013), https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-13-581A1.pdf. 
8  See generally Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal 
Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoid-
ance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 943, 957 (2016) (analyz-
ing “how philosophies of minimalism and avoidance have detrimentally affected First 
Amendment doctrines since Justice Kagan joined the Roberts Court”).
9  135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
Beyond Trademarks and Offense
27
The odious speech there consisted of a proposed specialty license 
plate bearing the Confederate battle flag. Its censor, in turn, was 
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board, which rejected the 
plate because “many members of the general public find the design 
offensive.”10 Would the Court hit a First Amendment homer and de-
clare this a seemingly easy case of viewpoint discrimination violat-
ing core free-speech principles? 
No. Instead, the five-justice majority—a bloc of four liberal-leaning 
justices (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan) joined by Clarence Thomas—completely whiffed. Fall-
ing back on something called the government-speech doctrine, the 
majority held that messages on specialty license plates are speech of 
the government, not the private groups—in Walker, the Sons of Con-
federate Veterans—that design and sponsor them. And when the 
government speaks, the First Amendment has little application; the 
government can say what it likes, delete messages it doesn’t like, and 
engage in viewpoint discrimination. As Justice Breyer wrote for the 
majority, “government statements (and government actions and pro-
grams that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First 
Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”11 La-
beling a mode of expression “government speech” gives the govern-
ment a free pass to discriminate against viewpoints it deems noxious. 
Justice Samuel Alito, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, bristled at applying 
the government speech doctrine to Texas’s specialty plates. Alito 
opined that the messages “proposed by private parties and placed 
on Texas specialty plates are private speech, not government speech. 
Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint. That is 
what it did here.”12 For him, expanding the government-speech doc-
trine to cover specialty plates “establishes a precedent that threatens 
private speech that government finds displeasing.”13
At best, Walker proved a fleeting, feel-good win for those who find 
Confederate-flag imagery racist. That’s because the script flipped 
soon thereafter in North Carolina. The Walker majority’s holding 
10  Id. at 2245.
11  Id. at 2245–46. 
12  Id. at 2263 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
13  Id. at 2254.
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that specialty plates are government speech sustained the Tar Heel 
State’s offering a “Choose Life” specialty plate but denying a pro-
choice alternative.14 In the simplest of stereotypes, the political left 
used the government speech doctrine to thwart a Confederate flag 
license plate in Texas, while the political right later used it to stifle 
a pro-choice plate in North Carolina. It was political tit-for-tat. At 
worst, then, Walker gave government entities an elastic mechanism 
for sanctioning viewpoint discrimination and dodging First Amend-
ment challenges. 
Then along came Matal v. Tam. It brought back the arguments 
about government-assisted speech in a context that invited the Court 
to (1) roll back, or at least cabin and confine, Walker’s government-
speech doctrine; or (2) revisit the issue of whether viewpoint dis-
crimination (normally verboten) becomes acceptable in that setting. 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has statutory power 
to reject registration for marks that “may disparage . . . persons, liv-
ing or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them 
into contempt, or disrepute.”15 For example, the PTO used this power 
to rebuff the effort of an Oregon-based Asian-American band called 
The Slants to register its name as a mark, finding that the name, as 
a reference to slanted eyes, had been employed to disparage Asian-
Americans. Slants frontman, Simon Tam, countered that the band 
was reappropriating the term, wresting away its power, sting, and 
stigma from hate mongers. 
What is “reappropriation”? In academic parlance, it’s “the process 
of taking possession of a slur previously used exclusively by domi-
nant groups to reinforce a stigmatized group’s lesser status.”16 The 
Slants explain their meaning more lyrically in “From the Heart,” a 
tune about fighting the PTO on the aptly titled album The Band Who 
Must Not Be Named:
Sorry if we try too hard 
To take some power back for ours. 
The language of oppression 
14  ACLU of North Carolina v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016). 
15  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017).
16  Adam D. Galinsky et al., The Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: The Recip-
rocal Relationship between Power and Self-Labeling, 24 Psychol. Sci. 2020, 2020 (2013).
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Will lose to education 
Until the words can’t hurt us again. 
So sorry if you take offense, 
But silence will not make amends. 
The system’s all wrong 
And it won’t be long 
Before the kids are singing our song.17
In December 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
sitting en banc, ruled in The Slants’ favor and struck down the dispar-
agement clause, holding that “the First Amendment forbids govern-
ment regulators to deny registration because they find the speech 
likely to offend others.”18 The appellate court found not only that the 
clause was viewpoint-based and could not pass muster under the 
rigorous strict-scrutiny standard of review,19 but also that it failed 
under the more relaxed intermediate-scrutiny test governing com-
mercial speech. The government petitioned the Supreme Court to 
hear the case, and The Slants, despite the Federal Circuit ruling in 
their favor, did likewise. The band argued the “issue is undeniably 
important. The Court is very likely to address it in the near future, 
in another case if not in this one. Meanwhile, respondent Simon Tam 
waits in limbo. His trademark rights will not be secure until the 
Court resolves this issue once and for all.”20  
In September 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to hear what was then 
known as Lee v. Tam. It framed the issue simply as whether the dispar-
agement clause “is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment.”21 With The Slants case on its docket, the Court 
17  The Slants, From the Heart, on The Band Who Must Not Be Named (In Music We 
Trust Records, 2017). Take a listen and look on YouTube at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pwfEgcRXJjM.
18  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
19  Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that it has a compelling interest 
to support a statute and that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
20  Brief for Respondent at 1, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (June 20, 2016).
21  Question Presented, Matal v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01293qp.pdf. 
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denied a petition one week later in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse. That 
case centered on the PTO’s cancellation of six registered marks involv-
ing variations of the NFL football team name Washington Redskins as 
disparaging to Native Americans. The outcome of the Redskins’ battle 
thus would hinge on the result in The Slants case.
Saving its Tam decision until the penultimate week of its term, 
the Court on June 19, 2017 delivered what would have amounted to 
a First Amendment home run if not for some unfortunate four-to-
four fracturing among the justices on logic and reasoning regarding 
viewpoint discrimination. Call it a triple.
All eight justices (newbie Neil Gorsuch played no part) agreed 
on the pro-free-speech outcome—that the disparagement clause, as 
Justice Alito wrote in announcing the Court’s judgment, “offends a 
bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on 
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”22 That’s an extremely 
close paraphrase of the Court’s reasoning nearly 30 years earlier 
protecting flag-burning as political speech.23 It’s also a clear winner 
for The Slants, the Redskins and other provocatively named groups 
seeking federal trademark registration like Dykes on Bikes,24 as well 
as more generally for free-speech advocates everywhere. Indeed, 
shortly after the ruling, Simon Tam called it “a win for all marginal-
ized groups. It can’t be a win for free speech if some people benefit 
and others don’t. The First Amendment protects speech even that we 
disagree with.”25
22  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
23  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle un-
derlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
24  Like The Slants, the San Francisco Dykes on Bikes Women’s Motorcycle Contingent 
had fought lengthy registration battles with the PTO, which contended that “dykes” 
disparages lesbians. Somewhat echoing The Slants argument regarding reappropria-
tion, Dykes on Bikes filed a friend-of-the-court brief in Tam arguing that “[a] trademark 
allows Dykes on Bikes to identify as a group by using language that invokes the mem-
bers’ own identities. That ability to associate individual identity with group identity 
and communicate a message unique to that group is central to the First Amendment.” 
Brief of Amicus Curiae San Francisco Dykes on Bikes Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 
Inc., Matal v. Tam, No. 15-1293, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3872, at 10–11 (June 19, 2017). 
25  Joe Coscarelli, Why the Slants Took a Fight over Their Band Name to the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. Times, June 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/arts/mu-
sic/slants-name-supreme-court-ruling.html. 
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Thus, the constitutional outcome in Tam is not groundbreak-
ing. Rather, it is principles-affirming: there is no categorical 
carve-out from First Amendment protection for either offensive 
or hateful speech, and viewpoint discrimination—something 
Justice Kennedy took pains to reinforce in a concurrence—is 
anathema to the First Amendment unless the government is 
speaking.
A close read of the trio of opinions in Tam reveals, however, at least 
seven other points that may affect future rulings in First Amend-
ment disputes. Before addressing those items, a quick breakdown of 
the three opinions provides critical context: 
1. Justice Alito wrote for a unanimous Court in some parts 
(most significantly, regarding government speech), for 
seven justices in another, and—critically—on behalf of 
only four justices (himself, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer) 
in several sections; 
2. Justice Kennedy agreed with the judgment but wrote a 
concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, centering on viewpoint discrimination and 
contending that a tighter focus on that concept would 
have eliminated the need for the other four justices to 
address other issues; and 
3. Justice Thomas joined Alito’s opinion in all but one 
rather non-crucial part and wrote separately to reit-
erate his prior position that commercial speech cases 
should be evaluated under strict, not intermediate, 
scrutiny. 
As this breakdown suggests, the biggest rift in reasoning was 
between the Alito bloc on the one hand and the Kennedy bloc on 
the other. Although all eight justices agreed the law was viewpoint 
based, the former group delved into questions that the latter, by 
maintaining a crisper focus on viewpoint discrimination, would 
have jettisoned. Indeed, as argued later, Kennedy’s concurrence 
provides a more clear, elegant articulation of when a statute is view-
point based and, in turn, of the power of the doctrine against view-
point discrimination to shut down other long-shot, statute-saving 
arguments. 
Packingham v. North Carolina—another First Amendment free-
speech decision issued the same day as Tam—displayed a nearly 
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identical fracturing.26 In Packingham, the Court struck down a state 
statute that banned registered sex offenders from using online so-
cial media services such as Facebook. Delivering the Court’s opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy once again was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, as well as Breyer. Similarly, Justice Alito was 
joined again by Roberts and Thomas, this time in a concurrence ob-
jecting to the Kennedy bloc’s “unnecessary rhetoric” and “undisci-
plined dicta” about the importance of preserving the Internet and 
social media networks as venues for expression.
In brief, Kennedy and Alito each authored opinions in Tam 
and Packingham that agreed with a pro-free-speech result. Yet the 
Kennedy-authored opinions in both Tam (a concurrence) and Pack-
ingham (the Court’s opinion) (1) were joined by all of the ostensibly 
liberal-leaning justices (save for Breyer in Tam), and (2) failed to gain 
traction with a three-justice bloc of ostensible conservatives (Alito, 
Roberts, and Thomas). Kennedy’s penchant for grandiose statements 
about the importance of free speech—something predating Tam and 
Packingham27—may have driven a wedge between him and, as ex-
plained shortly below, the typically less free-speech friendly Alito.
The seven points—not necessarily in order of importance—from 
Tam that might affect future First Amendment speech cases in con-
texts beyond trademark law are these: (1) Justice Alito actually can 
pen an opinion protecting offensive expression; (2) Justice Breyer 
doesn’t always go off into the balancing weeds of proportionality or 
denigrate fundamental First Amendment doctrines; (3) nary a justice 
26  137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
27  Kennedy often extols the value of free expression with rhetorical flourishes. See, 
e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“First Amendment protections are both personal and structural. Free speech begins 
with the right of each person to think and then to express his or her own ideas. Pro-
tecting this personal sphere of intellect and conscience, in turn, creates structural safe-
guards for many of the processes that define a free society.”); United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This 
is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; 
to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”); Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the beginning 
of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the 
beginning of thought.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 
701 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment is often inconvenient. But 
that is beside the point. Inconvenience does not absolve the government of its obliga-
tion to tolerate speech.”).
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fell to the pox of political correctness, even though the outcome of 
the Redskins case was resting in the balance and the floodgates were 
predicted to burst open with disparaging registered marks; (4) there 
was united pushback against the government-speech doctrine, 
stretching it beyond Walker; (5) the commercial-speech doctrine, 
premised on intermediate scrutiny review, someday may yet fall by 
the wayside; (6) while the whole Court agrees that viewpoint dis-
crimination is wrong, justices conceptualize it differently and assign 
it differing degrees of importance; and (7) faith among the justices 
in the venerable marketplace-of-ideas theory remains remarkably 
strong in the digital age. Here’s a more extended take on each item.
Alito Rides to the Defense of Offense
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court came to the defense of the 
Westboro Baptist Church and ruled for its right to engage in anti-gay, 
anti-family, and anti-military speech near a funeral for a U.S. soldier 
killed in Iraq. Only one justice dissented: Samuel Alito. “Our pro-
found national commitment to free and open debate is not a license 
for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case,” he wrote, 
explaining why he would have ruled for the plaintiff’s tort claims 
against Westboro.28
One year prior, in United States v. Stevens, the Court nullified as 
overbroad a federal law targeting so-called crush videos depicting 
the killing and mutilation of animals. There again, only one justice 
dissented: Samuel Alito. “The Court strikes down in its entirety a 
valuable statute . . . that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to 
prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty—in particular, the creation 
and commercial exploitation of ‘crush videos,’ a form of depraved 
entertainment that has no social value,” Alito opined.29
Alito also authored a dissent—this one joined by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas—in United States v. Alvarez. The Court there applied the 
“most exacting scrutiny” to declare unconstitutional the Stolen Valor 
Act, which made it a federal crime to lie about having won a Con-
gressional Medal of Honor. “The lies covered by the Stolen Valor Act 
have no intrinsic value and thus merit no First Amendment protec-
tion unless their prohibition would chill other expression that falls 
28  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
29  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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within the Amendment’s scope,” Alito wrote.30 Foreshadowing the 
Alito-versus-Kennedy opinions in Tam and Packingham, Alito’s Alva-
rez dissent took aim at the Kennedy-authored plurality opinion. 
I asserted several years ago that it seemed Alito was “trying to 
change . . . First Amendment jurisprudence when it comes to offen-
sive speech that he perceives to be of low value . . . in order to meet 
his own subjective standards of decency, civility, and substantive 
importance of expression.”31 Or, as Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea 
more recently and succinctly put it, “Alito does not have a track re-
cord as a particularly speech-protective Justice.”32
But in Tam, he proved quite capable of writing an opinion pro-
tecting offensive speech that won over, in various parts, a majority 
and plurality of his fellow justices. That’s excellent news from a free-
speech perspective, but does it mean that Alito has changed his First 
Amendment stripes?
That’s highly doubtful. Alito’s opinion in Tam, I suspect, was re-
ally about thwarting political correctness, even if the disparagement 
clause had been on the books since 1946, decades before “PC” be-
came a term. This anti-PC motivation is evident when Alito deri-
sively dubs the statute “a happy-talk clause” and when he attacks the 
government’s argument that it “has an interest in preventing speech 
expressing ideas that offend.” Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
Alito retorts that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnic-
ity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is 
hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is 
that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”33 
Alito’s defense of Confederate flags on specialty license plates in his 
Walker dissent similarly reflects an anti-political-correctness stance; 
he was defending the right to display a polysemic symbol vilified by 
the political left. 
30  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 739 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
31  Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War against Abhorrent, Low-Value 
Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions 
of Morality and Merit, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 115, 169 (2011).
32  Mary-Rose Papandrea, Free Speech Foundations Symposium: The Government 
Brand, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1197 (2016).
33  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 
279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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For Alito, battling perceived political correctness in Tam and 
Walker is a far more important—and decidedly different—cause 
than safeguarding speech that (1) harms a grieving father—a pri-
vate figure, no less—at his son’s funeral (Snyder); (2) depicts helpless 
animals victimized by humans’ sadistic sexual fetishes (Stevens); and 
(3) degrades the honor, as embodied by medals, of some of the brav-
est individuals who heroically fought enemy forces in the nation’s 
wars (Alvarez). Those factual differences are probably pertinent for 
Alito in distinguishing Tam and Walker from Snyder, Stevens, and 
Alvarez. In brief, Alito’s First Amendment stance in Tam may not cut 
across the free-speech playing field. 
Breyer for Once Hews to Traditional Doctrinal Lines
In multiple free-speech cases such as Alvarez and Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert,34 Justice Breyer demonstrates aversion to adhering to tra-
ditional doctrinal rules and labels while, instead, embracing a ju-
risprudence of proportionality. As a recent article puts it, Breyer 
“appears to distrust the Court’s typical strict scrutiny framework 
for evaluating freedom of speech cases, including certain disputes 
where viewpoint discrimination is at issue. Frequently, he prefers 
employing a ‘proportionality’ balancing test for the vast majority 
of cases, refusing to place a heightened burden upon the statute at 
issue.”35 Professor Mark Tushnet contends that Breyer is engaged in 
a “project of partial de-doctrinalization.”36
Breyer’s 2015 concurrence in Reed, which struck down a con-
tent-based sign ordinance under strict scrutiny, is illustrative. Al-
though agreeing with the result, Breyer rejected the “mechanical 
use of categories” like strict scrutiny and content discrimination.37 
In their place, he argued for “a more basic analysis, which . . . asks 
whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment 
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory 
34  135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
35  Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid 
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 Alb. L. Rev. 403, 506 (2016).
36  Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech 
Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 508, 514 (2014).
37  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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objectives.”38 The term content discrimination, for Breyer, sometimes 
merits treatment merely “as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but 
not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the 
strength of a justification.”39 
Such squishiness surfaced again in 2015 when Breyer concurred 
with a five-justice majority in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that a rule 
banning judges from personally soliciting funds for their election 
campaigns survived strict scrutiny.40 Referencing the traditional 
categories of constitutional review of strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and rational basis, Breyer wrote that he viewed the “Court’s 
doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as guidelines informing our ap-
proach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.”41 In 
fact, attacking the established doctrinal approach was the only rea-
son Breyer wrote separately in Williams-Yulee: his concurrence was 
two sentences long and made no other points. 
One thus can’t be faulted for believing that if Breyer someday has 
his way, he might import into free-speech cases the same balanc-
ing approach to the undue-burden standard he embraced in 2016 in 
the abortion-restriction case of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt.42 
Writing there for a five-justice majority, Breyer held that courts must 
“consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer.”43 Justice Thomas derided this 
tack as a “free-form balancing test.”44 
In the realm of free expression, Breyer’s Hellerstedt iteration of 
the undue-burden test might mean weighing the benefits of a re-
striction on speech against the burdens the regulation imposes on 
both speakers and audiences to, respectively, convey and receive the 
speech via other nonrestricted alternative means. In other words, it 
might be fairly close to a proportionality analysis.
But in Tam, Breyer toed traditional doctrinal lines safeguarding of-
fensive speech and prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. He didn’t 
38  Id. at 2235–36.
39  Id. at 2235 (emphasis added).
40  135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
41  Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
42  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
43  Id. at 2309.
44  Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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wander off to write a concurrence; in fact, he joined all parts and 
sections of the opinion authored by Alito. Perhaps most remark-
able, he joined the section of Alito’s opinion in which Alito, who had 
dissented in Walker, bluntly described the Breyer-authored major-
ity opinion in that case as likely marking “the outer bounds of the 
government speech doctrine.”45 The only thing Breyer did not do in 
Tam was join the more decisive, case-killing approach to viewpoint 
discrimination adopted in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. It may 
be that Kennedy’s more definitive doctrinal methodology to view-
point discrimination in Tam is what caused Breyer—unlike fellow 
liberal-leaning Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—not to 
join Kennedy.
Political Correctness Loses Its Appeal 
Looming in the Tam courthouse, acknowledged or not, was the 
controversy over a half-dozen then-canceled trademarks for the 
Washington Redskins football team. The fate of those marks would 
turn on the result in Tam, so it was not surprising that a friend-of-
the-court brief was filed in the case by several Native American or-
ganizations on behalf of the government. That brief asserted, among 
other things, that the “use of ‘REDSKINS’—like other racially dis-
paraging sports mascots—inflicts real injury. These mascots demean 
and dehumanize the target group; they foster misinformation and 
inappropriate stereotype; and they hinder development of self-es-
teem and other preconditions for social success.”46 
Professor Adam Epstein once contended that “if there is a current 
professional team name that has sparked legal controversy over the 
issue of politically incorrect nicknames, it is the Washington Red-
skins football team.”47 Thus, if the 1995 battle for Major League Base-
ball’s crown between the Atlanta Braves and Cleveland Indians was 
the “Politically Incorrect World Series,”48 then the fight in Pro-Foot-
45  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
46  Brief of Amici Curiae Native American Organizations in Support of Petitioner, 
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
47  Adam Epstein, Maryland Sports Law, 15 U. Denv. Sports & Ent. L.J. 49, 56 (2013).
48  Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team 
Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 Sports Law. J. 65, 65 (1997).
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ball, Inc. v. Blackhorse49 was shaping up as the legal Super Bowl over 
impolite marks. 
When the Supreme Court ruled for The Slants, it therefore was 
not surprising one scholar claimed “the Court struck a blow against 
political correctness.”50 But it was hardly the first time the Court had 
done that. 
Specifically, all of the justices involved in Tam—save Alito—ruled 
in 2011 for the right of Westboro Baptist Church members to use po-
litically incorrect statements such as “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers,” and “Pope in Hell.”51 That’s a trio of targets—the 
LGBTQ community, military, and Catholic church—of a combined 
sensitivity not far off from that of Asians or Native Americans. Sen-
sitivity over the nation’s racial history was also in play in Walker, 
although a bare majority there squelched the offending imagery. 
Speech inviting offense was nothing new.
In late June 2017, the battle over registering the Redskins’ vari-
ous marks concluded. The U.S. Justice Department filed a letter on 
June 28, 2017, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
(where Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse was pending) and asked the 
court, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tam, to enter judg-
ment in favor of Pro-Football.52 The next day, Amanda Blackhorse’s 
attorney filed a similar letter.53
Thus, in the early months of Donald J. Trump’s tenure as an oft-
politically incorrect and name-calling provocateur president, the 
Court confirmed that under our system, there is no right to be free 
of offensive expression. And while political turmoil still roils the na-
tion’s capital, its pro football team can—at least in the merchandis-
ing space—rest a tad easier after Tam. 
49  112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016).
50  Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Doesn’t Care What You Say on the Internet, Bloom-
berg View (June 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-19/
supreme-court-doesn-t-care-what-you-say-on-the-internet.
51  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
52  Letter from Mark R. Freeman, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 
to Patricia S. Connor, Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 28, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015c-f0a0-d1e3-a97d-f9f436400001.
53  Letter from Jesse A. Witten, Counsel for Appellees Amanda Blackhorse et al., to 
Patricia S. Connor, Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 29, 
2017), http://was.247sports.com/Bolt/Native-American-tribespeople-drop-case-re-
garding-Redskins-name-53381907.
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Beating Back the Government-Speech Doctrine 
The government-speech doctrine, Professor Mark Strasser points 
out, is not merely new—it dates back fewer than 30 years to the 
Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan, which upheld a program that de-
nied federal funding to entities that perform abortions54—but also 
underdeveloped.55 Indeed, Professor Papandrea asserts the doctrine 
is plagued by a “brief and troubled history.”56
Yet this nascent canon is simultaneously formidable and dangerous. 
As I recently wrote, it is “a powerful weapon in a state’s arsenal for ex-
pression—one deployable both for promoting the government’s own 
viewpoint and, conversely, for squelching the views of others with 
which it disagrees”57 provided they can be identified as an extension 
of the government’s own expression. As the Supreme Court encapsu-
lated it in 2009, “the Free Speech Clause restricts government regula-
tion of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”58
The government-speech doctrine, if applied to trademarks, would 
permit the PTO to blatantly discriminate against viewpoints when 
denying registration. The PTO could unabashedly bully marks that 
supposedly disparage groups by not registering them, while con-
versely promoting marks that laud, praise, or compliment those 
same groups by granting them registration. 
Before the June 2017 ruling in Tam, but subsequent to the Court’s 
using the government-speech doctrine in Walker to censor the Con-
federate flag, lower courts concluded that the following constitute 
government speech: (1) a public school program allowing private 
businesses to hang self-promotional, school-partnership banners 
from school fences—picture outfield walls at baseball fields—in 
exchange for monetary donations;59 (2) the words on food trucks 
54  500 U.S. 173 (1991).
55  Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the First Amendment, 
44 Hastings Const. L.Q. 37, 38 (2016).
56  Papandrea, supra note 32, at 1198.
57  Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker’s Wake: Early Rifts and 
Reverberations on Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination, and Offensive Expression, 
25 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1239, 1243 (2017).
58  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
59  Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 73 (2016). Classifying the banner program as government speech allowed 
the school district to deny banners to an individual who wanted to promote his math-
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(including the names of businesses painted on them) taking part in 
a government-sponsored summer-lunch program held on govern-
ment-owned property;60 and (3) privately produced tourist guides 
and informational brochures distributed at rest stops and welcome 
centers owned by Virginia along its highways.61
It is not shocking, then, that one of the most important doctrinal 
issues in Tam was whether federally registered trademarks consti-
tute government speech. The PTO argued that federal registration 
of marks transforms private expression into government speech—
despite the fact that marks are not only created by private entities, 
but also used by those entities to identify themselves, their goods, 
and their services. Classifying federally registered trademarks as 
government speech would allow the PTO to deny registration to 
The Slants mark and, critically, to dodge all First Amendment-based 
challenges to its decision.
Under the PTO’s logic in Tam, when you see Nike’s omnipresent 
registered “swoosh” trademark on Nike running shorts (“Norts,” as 
my undergrads dub them), it is the government—not the maker of 
athletic apparel and footwear—that is speaking. The government’s 
argument in Tam thus sounded somewhat preposterous, but the 
Court in Walker opened the gate for it by holding that the messages 
on specialty license plates are those of the government, not those of 
either the private entities that design and create them or the private 
individuals who choose to display them.
Prior to Walker, the Court in 2009 held in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum that permanent monuments displayed in public parks con-
stitute government speech, regardless of whether the monuments 
are designed, built, and donated by private entities.62 In that case, a 
tutoring business but who had previously worked as a porn star. In brief, the person’s 
prior occupation was successfully used against him and his current, decidedly non-
pornographic speech without raising a First Amendment issue.
60  Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016). Labeling such expression government speech allowed the 
government to deny a permit, based on its alleged offensiveness, to the Wandering 
Dago food truck.
61  Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transport., No. 16-1404, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5452 (Mar. 29, 2017).
62  555 U.S. 460 (2009). See Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The 
Supreme Court Finds a Public Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible 
Government Speech, 2008-2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 271 (2009).
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religious entity called Summum sought to erect a stone monument 
bearing its “seven aphorisms” in a public park in Pleasant Grove City, 
Utah. When the city rejected Summum’s request, the religious order 
sued, claiming violation of the Free Speech Clause and pointing out 
that the city had previously accepted a donated monument featuring 
the Ten Commandments in the same park. Summum contended that 
public parks are traditional public fora for expression—something 
that the Court has long acknowledged—and that viewpoint discrim-
ination in such venues violates the First Amendment. 
Without dissent, the Court rejected Summum’s arguments. Justice 
Alito, penning the Court’s opinion, rebuffed the public forum argu-
ment, citing spatial concerns that “public parks can accommodate 
only a limited number of permanent monuments.”63 While parks 
constitute sacred First Amendment space known as traditional pub-
lic fora for some types of ephemeral expression—speeches, marches, 
rallies, and concerts—they don’t where permanent monuments 
are involved. As Alito put it, “it is hard to imagine how a public 
park could be opened up for the installation of permanent monu-
ments by every person or group wishing to engage in that form of 
expression.”64 Consider, in other words, grounds so crowded and 
cluttered by monuments that no space remains for bike paths, ball 
fields, swing sets, and the occasional amphitheater. 
Beyond the spatial issue, Alito pointed to another factor—public 
perception—suggesting that donated, park-located monuments are 
government speech. “Public parks are often closely identified in 
the public mind with the government unit that owns the land,” he 
wrote, adding that:
Government decisionmakers select the monuments that 
portray what they view as appropriate for the place in 
question, taking into account such content-based factors as 
esthetics, history, and local culture. The monuments that are 
accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect 
of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute 
government speech.65
63  Summum, 555 U.S. at 478.
64  Id. at 479.
65  Id. at 472.
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But even in Summum, the government-speech doctrine rested on a 
shaky foundation. Alito, for example, openly acknowledged “there 
may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a govern-
ment entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum 
for private speech.”66 Justice Breyer, who later wrote for the major-
ity in Walker, delivered a concurrence, stressing—per his propensity 
for doctrinal squishiness addressed earlier—his “understanding 
that the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid 
category.”67 And Justice David Souter, citing the doctrine’s relative 
recency, cautioned that “it would do well for us to go slow in set-
ting its bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet 
explored.”68
But in Walker, the five-justice majority threw caution to the wind. 
In holding that specialty license plates are government speech, it ig-
nored the fact that, unlike in Summum, there was no spatial scarcity 
problem. A seemingly vast number of specialty plates could coex-
ist happily on Texas’s registered vehicles; this was not a public park 
with finite acreage. In fact, when Walker was decided, more than 350 
different specialty plates were on vehicles registered in the Lone Star 
State.69
Instead of focusing on Summum’s scarcity concern, the Breyer-
authored majority identified three factors—history, perception, 
and control—leading it to find that specialty plates are government 
speech. The first factor was the historical use of the medium as a 
means for expression. Specifically, Breyer wrote that “the history 
of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed 
more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they long 
have communicated messages from the States.”70
The second variable—this one borrowed from Summum—was 
public perception regarding who is speaking: the government or a 
private entity? In Walker, Breyer found that because Texas not only is-
sues all specialty plates, but also emblazons each with “Texas” at the 
66  Id. at 470.
67  Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring).
68  Id. at 485 (Souter, J., concurring).
69  Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2255 (2015) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).
70  Id. at 2248.
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top, viewers likely perceive them as “government IDs.”71 Citing nary 
a shred of evidence to support the claim, Breyer also reasoned that “a 
person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends 
to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message.”72
Finally, the Walker majority considered the amount of control Texas 
exerts over specialty plates. Breyer determined that “Texas maintains 
direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates” be-
cause its Department of Motor Vehicles Board “must approve every 
specialty plate design proposal before the design can appear on a 
Texas plate.”73
Justice Alito, joined by the more conservative justices not named 
Thomas, scoffed at this approach, contending that the majority’s 
“capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and 
painful bite out of the First Amendment.”74 Alito asserted that any 
person sitting by a Texas highway and watching cars speed by with 
specialty plates “bearing the name[s] of a high school, a fraternity 
or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of 
the American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a 
favorite burger restaurant, and a favorite NASCAR driver” would 
not believe that such sentiments were those of Texas but rather the 
cars’ owners.75 
Tam marked the first time since Walker that the Court revisited the 
government-speech doctrine. Significantly, all eight justices partici-
pating in Tam joined the part of the opinion addressing government 
speech, thus presenting a unified front on this malleable doctrine. 
And although the justices did not jettison the government-speech 
doctrine to the dumpster of failed First Amendment principles, they 
made several efforts seemingly designed to curb its use. How did 
they do that?
First and foremost, the Court flatly rejected the government’s 
contention that trademark registration converts private marks 
into government speech. As if channeling his snarky inner-Scalia, 
Alito posed twin rhetorical questions: “if trademarks represent 
71  Id. at 2249.
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
75  Id. 
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government speech, what does the Government have in mind when 
it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), ‘Think different’ 
(Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)? Was 
the Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered 
the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?”76 The queries pounded home Ali-
to’s point that if registered marks are government speech, then the 
government “is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial 
products and services.”77
Alito also engaged in some slippery-slope logic about the danger 
of calling registered marks government speech: “If federal registra-
tion makes a trademark government speech and thus eliminates all 
First Amendment protection, would the registration of the copy-
right for a book produce a similar transformation?”78 Such an out-
come would, akin to the PTO’s attack on The Slants for disparaging 
Asians, give the U.S. Copyright Office power to discriminate against 
original works of authorship that disparage groups. It could, for ex-
ample, easily deny copyright registration to Bruce Springsteen’s lyr-
ics for “Born in the U.S.A.” because the song’s protagonist is sent off 
“to a foreign land to go and kill the yellow man.” 
Beyond simply ruling against the PTO, the Court also signaled 
that the government-speech doctrine must be reeled in. Notably, 
it dubbed the doctrine “susceptible to dangerous misuse,” thereby 
necessitating the Court to “exercise great caution before extending 
our government speech precedents”79 such as Summum and Walker. 
And when it came to Walker—the opinion on which the PTO most 
heavily relied—Alito remarked that Walker “likely marks the outer 
bounds of the government speech doctrine.”80 Additionally, none of 
the three factors deployed in Walker—history, perception, and con-
trol—militated in favor of classifying registered trademarks as gov-
ernment speech, Alito wrote.
Perhaps more subtly limiting the doctrine’s future scope was 
an Alito-created example suggesting it only applies and permits 
76  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017).
77  Id.
78  Id. at 1760.
79  Id. at 1758.
80  Id. at 1760.
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viewpoint discrimination when, in fact, it is the government that 
genuinely creates and conveys a message:
During the Second World War, the Federal Government 
produced and distributed millions of posters to promote 
the war effort. There were posters urging enlistment, the 
purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of scarce 
resources. These posters expressed a viewpoint, but the First 
Amendment did not demand that the Government balance 
the message of these posters by producing and distributing 
posters encouraging Americans to refrain from engaging in 
these activities.81
Initially, this example is critical because it intimates that the 
government-speech doctrine is confined to scenarios  in which the 
government itself produces and conveys a message related to its 
own interest. Furthermore, Alito’s example smacks of gravitas—
World War II, the military, national security, and urgently safe-
guarding the very future of the United States—whereas Walker, 
setting aside a Confederate-flag plate, involved the relative frivol-
ity of specialized license plates supporting, among other things, 
multiple college sports teams and playing golf.82 
Additionally, the message on wartime posters regarding army en-
listment and war bonds directly ties to a specific government pur-
pose or end that it hopes to achieve—winning a war. A specialty 
plate bearing the phrase “Rather Be Golfing” clearly does not seem 
to achieve any government purpose unless, perhaps, the government 
81  Id. at 1758.
82  As Alito rhetorically asked in Walker:
If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at 
8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: “This is the 
official policy of the State – better to golf than to work?” If you 
did your viewing at the start of the college football season and 
you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of Tex-
as’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games—Notre Dame, 
Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa 
State—would you assume that the State of Texas was officially 
(and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ oppo-
nents? 
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2255 (2015) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).
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wants to generate revenue for itself from public courses. But that 
possibility is about as much of a legal stretch as was the PTO’s ar-
gument in favor of government speech in Tam. Alito’s example thus 
intimates that only when truly serious matters are at stake and, in 
turn, only when the government is the entity that actually creates 
and conveys the message for its own purpose, does it get a pass, via 
the government-speech doctrine, on the general rule against view-
point discrimination. 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Tam buttressed 
Alito’s efforts to confine the government-speech doctrine. Specifi-
cally, Kennedy called it a “narrow” exception to the general rule 
against viewpoint discrimination, contending such narrowness is 
necessary “to prevent the government from claiming that every gov-
ernment program is exempt from the First Amendment.”83 Kennedy 
had joined Alito’s dissent in Walker, so it is not surprising they were 
on the same page in this facet of Tam.
Ultimately, if the Court threw caution to the wind in Walker by 
unleashing the government-speech doctrine to sweep up specialty 
license plates that are designed, sponsored, and displayed by private 
entities and individuals, then in Tam it signaled a desire to keep the 
doctrine tightly tethered. Alito, who dissented against the use of the 
doctrine in Walker, thereby exacted a small measure of revenge in 
Tam. 
Walker might turn out to be a dangerous but feel-good (at least for 
its liberal-bloc majority) one-off ruling to stop politically incorrect 
Confederate flags. Yet it remains good law today, even in the face of 
a unanimous effort to halt its momentum in Tam. 
Putting the Commercial Speech Doctrine into Play Again
It wasn’t until the 1970s that the Supreme Court extended formal 
First Amendment protection to truthful advertisements for lawful 
goods and services. Yet, the Court consistently treats commercial 
speech less favorably than other types of expression such as politi-
cal speech. The Court does so by measuring the validity of restric-
tions on commercial speech against an intermediate—rather than 
83  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1768 (2017) (Ken nedy, J., concurring).
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strict—scrutiny test that affords greater deference to the govern-
ment.84 In brief, it generally is easier for the government to regulate 
ads for products and services than for it to regulate speech about 
other matters.
Justice Thomas, however, has long objected to this second-tier 
treatment of commercial expression. One scholar notes that Thomas 
has “clearly staked out his claim as a First Amendment defender in 
his commercial speech opinions.”85 As Thomas opined in 2001, “I 
continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truth-
ful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is 
appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be character-
ized as ‘commercial.’”86
Tam provided Thomas with another opportunity to make this 
point. That’s because the government argued that trademarks are 
commercial speech—basically just names by which companies pro-
mote themselves. Applying the usual intermediate-scrutiny test for 
commercial-speech cases, a bloc of four justices in Tam—Alito, Rob-
erts, Breyer, and Thomas—held that the disparagement clause failed 
to meet this standard. That conclusion is unremarkable.
Thomas, however, penned a concurrence. He agreed the dispar-
agement clause was “unconstitutional even under the less stringent 
test” for commercial-speech cases, but he also reiterated his position 
that strict scrutiny provides the appropriate test in such disputes.87 
84  The U.S. Supreme Court fashioned a four-part test for commercial speech that 
requires courts to
determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 
see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”).
85  David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a Commercial-
Speech Protector, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 485, 486 (2002).
86  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
87  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Although Thomas has yet to convince his fellow justices this should 
be the case, Alito’s plurality opinion in Tam provides support for that 
prospect in the future. 
In particular, Alito observed that “the line between commer-
cial and non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case 
illustrates.”88 Such murkiness is unsurprising, largely because the 
Court has never satisfactorily defined commercial speech in the first 
place. As one scholar bluntly wrote last year, “No one knows exactly 
what commercial speech is.”89  
The Court even passed on the opportunity to define it 14 years ago 
in a case involving Nike that blended commercial speech elements 
with political expression.90 There, the Court initially decided to hear 
the case, but then dismissed it, invoking the rarely used notion that 
its writ of certiorari had been “improvidently granted.”
Despite the definitional difficulties, the commercial versus non-
commercial distinction can be pivotal—even outcome-determina-
tive—because a statute is more likely to be struck down under strict 
scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny. Alito’s frank acknowledgement 
in Tam that the nation’s high court sometimes has trouble separating 
commercial and noncommercial speech further opens the door for 
scrapping what may be a false dichotomy. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s Tam concurrence further chops away at 
the notion that commercial-speech regulations are always subject 
only to intermediate scrutiny. As Kennedy wrote, “discrimination 
based on viewpoint, including a regulation that targets speech for 
its offensiveness, remains of serious concern in the commercial con-
text” and thus “necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny.”91 In other 
words, a statute restricting commercial speech is subjected to some-
thing more than just intermediate scrutiny when the regulation is 
viewpoint-based. Kennedy explained that neither the term nor cat-
egory of commercial speech provides “a blanket exemption from the 
First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality.”92 
88  Id. at 1765 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas and Breyer, JJ.).
89  Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Movement, 
11 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 1, 4 (2016).
90  Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
91  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) (Kennedy, J., con curring).
92  Id. 
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This logic builds on Kennedy’s 2011 majority opinion in Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc.93 The Court there struck down a Vermont statute 
banning pharmacies from selling, for marketing purposes, records 
revealing the prescribing histories of individually identifiable doc-
tors. Those records could be freely sold to others, but not to data-
harvesting pharmaceutical marketers who, in turn, would use 
the information to try to sell particular drugs to specific doctors. 
Kennedy found this disparate treatment of pharmaceutical market-
ers troubling, reasoning the statute “disfavors marketing, that is, 
speech with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfa-
vors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”94 
The law thus warranted heightened scrutiny—scrutiny greater than 
the usual intermediate standard for commercial speech—because it 
targeted particular speakers (pharmaceutical salespeople) and their 
viewpoints in using that information. The majority, however, backed 
down from actually applying strict scrutiny (or something like it) 
in Sorrell because it reasoned the statute couldn’t even pass muster 
under the lesser intermediate-scrutiny test.95
In summary, the trio of opinions in Tam authored by Justices 
Thomas, Breyer, and Kennedy collectively indicates that the future of 
an intermediate-scrutiny-based commercial-speech doctrine is per-
haps tenuous. And when Tam is viewed more broadly, it illustrates 
different definitional difficulties—one in distinguishing govern-
ment speech from private expression, the other in deciding what is 
commercial speech—now plaguing two relatively recent doctrines.
Viewpoint Discrimination: Contested Meaning and Effect 
Although all eight justices in Tam agreed that the disparagement 
clause unconstitutionally discriminated against a viewpoint, they 
split 4-4 on when viewpoint discrimination exists and when it is fatal 
to a statute. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, provided—in my view—a sharper, more textbook-like 
definition and emphasized the statute-killing power of the rule 
against viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito, joined by Justices 
93  564 U.S. 552 (2011).
94  Id. at 564.
95  As Justice Kennedy wrote, “the outcome is the same whether a special commercial 
speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.” Id. at 571.
Cato Supreme Court Review
50
Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer, took a more muddled approach. Be-
cause this rift may affect future cases, it helps to explore it in greater 
detail, starting with Kennedy’s opinion and then Alito’s take.
What is viewpoint discrimination? For Kennedy, it is a subset or 
subtype of a larger category of discrimination called content-based 
discrimination. In brief, content-based discrimination targets a spe-
cific subject matter, while viewpoint discrimination slices and dices 
within that subject matter and, as Kennedy wrote, singles “out a 
subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”96 
Put slightly differently by Kennedy, a viewpoint-based law imper-
missibly attempts “to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a 
broader debate” about a subject.97 The First Amendment mandates 
viewpoint neutrality by the government—the converse of viewpoint 
discrimination. 
The classroom example I use to illustrate this point compares 
two hypothetical laws restricting speech about abortion. Abortion, 
to use Kennedy’s words, is “the relevant subject” in both laws. One 
law restricts all speech about abortion and thus reflects content-based 
discrimination. The other law restricts only pro-choice speech about 
abortion (but not pro-life speech or other perspectives on abortion), 
thereby embodying viewpoint discrimination.
Applying this logic to the disparagement clause, Kennedy ex-
plained that the subjects targeted were “persons, living or dead, insti-
tutions, beliefs, or national symbols.” About such subjects, however, 
the clause permitted registration only for “a positive or benign mark 
but not a derogatory one. The law thus reflects the Government’s 
disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the es-
sence of viewpoint discrimination.”98 As applied to The Slants case, 
the clause allowed registering marks lauding Asian-Americans, but 
not ones disparaging them. It was that simple.
The impact of such viewpoint discrimination was, in turn, out-
come determinative for the Kennedy bloc. Viewpoint discrimina-
tion, he emphasized, is “so potent that it must be subject to rigorous 
constitutional scrutiny,” regardless of whether the speech offends 
audiences or is classified as commercial. “To the extent trademarks 
96  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., con curring).
97  Id. at 1767.
98  Id. at 1766.
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qualify as commercial speech, they are an example of why that 
term or category does not serve as a blanket exemption from the 
First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality,” Kennedy 
wrote.99 
That was an important point that divided the Court. Justices 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan believe that viewpoint-
based laws targeting commercial speech are subject to “rigorous” 
scrutiny. Thus, they did not join in the part of Justice Alito’s opinion 
in which he, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer analyzed the disparage-
ment clause under the deferential intermediate scrutiny that typi-
cally applies in commercial-speech cases. 
Kennedy identified only one exception to the principle that view-
point discrimination is verboten—namely, when the government-
speech doctrine applies. As he put it, “the Court’s precedents have 
recognized just one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimi-
nation is permissible: where the government itself is speaking or re-
cruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.”100 Because 
that lone exception to the rule against viewpoint discrimination did 
not apply in Tam, The Slants prevailed and the PTO lost. 
The bottom line for the Kennedy bloc in Tam is that the presence 
of viewpoint discrimination, coupled with the absence of govern-
ment speech, rendered “unnecessary any extended treatment of 
other questions raised by the parties.” The quoted part of that sen-
tence jabs at the ink spilled by Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer 
in considering the government’s back-up, ill-fated arguments that 
Tam should have been treated either as a government-subsidy case 
or under a proposed new doctrine for “government-program” cases.
Justice Alito’s analysis of viewpoint discrimination is more prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, and as noted above, although Alito 
found that the disparagement clause discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint, he nonetheless analyzed it under the intermediate-scru-
tiny test for commercial speech cases rather than a more rigorous 
standard. His choice didn’t affect the outcome in Tam because the 
Alito bloc found that the clause failed even under intermediate scru-
tiny. It does, however, reflect a key difference between the Kennedy 
and Alito blocs going forward regarding the correct standard when 
99  Id. at 1767.
100  Id. at 1768.
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a law targeting commercial speech also discriminates on the basis of 
viewpoint.
Second, Alito failed to provide a clear formula for determining 
when a law is viewpoint-based. He simply wrote that “[o]ur cases 
use the term ‘viewpoint’ discrimination in a broad sense”; the dis-
paragement clause was viewpoint-based because “[g]iving offense 
is a viewpoint.”101 Alito then cited a laundry list of cases, including 
the Court’s flag-burning decision of Texas v. Johnson102 and its ruling 
protecting pornographer Larry Flynt’s ability to luridly poke fun at 
Reverend Jerry Falwell in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,103 standing for 
the proposition that an idea cannot be censored simply because it 
offends. 
My worry is that Alito muddled two distinct doctrinal strands—
one generally prohibiting censorship based on offensiveness and one 
banning viewpoint discrimination—in finding that “giving offense 
is a viewpoint.” Consider Cohen v. California, the “Fuck the Draft” 
opinion noted at the start of the essay and a quintessential offensive 
speech case. The statute there targeted “offensive conduct,” and the 
Court framed the issue as whether California could “properly re-
move this offensive word from the public vocabulary.” 
But if offense equals a viewpoint, as Alito has it in Tam, then it’s 
surprising the Court in Cohen failed to analyze the California statute 
as an instance of viewpoint discrimination. There was, most notably, 
no examination by the Court of whether a person could freely say 
pro-draft messages in a courthouse but not make anti-draft state-
ments. That’s how a viewpoint-discrimination analysis likely would 
have unfolded in Cohen. 
Instead, the Court focused on (1) the need to protect the emotive—
not simply cognitive—function of speech, (2) the self-help remedy 
for those offended of averting their eyes from Paul Robert Cohen’s 
jacket-worn message, and (3) the vagueness problems with defining 
offensiveness. Justice John Marshall Harlan II remarked for the ma-
jority on this last point that
101  Id. at 1763 (plurality op.).
102  491 U.S. 397 (1989).
103  485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is 
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is 
nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s 
lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental 
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that 
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to 
the individual.104
The Court in Cohen, however, did recognize that offensiveness 
could serve as an excuse for discriminating against a viewpoint. As 
Harlan pointed out, “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that 
one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial 
risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might 
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient 
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”105 
In other words, offense and viewpoint are not always the same. 
The word “fuck” is what gave offense in Cohen, not Paul Robert 
Cohen’s anti-draft viewpoint. Taking offense at a word (“fuck”) is 
not the same as discriminating against the viewpoint in which that 
word is used (“fuck the draft”). “Fuck,” standing alone without “the 
draft,” is not a viewpoint. Giving or taking offense therefore is not 
always a viewpoint.
For Alito, Tam was more about protecting offensiveness than it 
was about prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. Alito’s discussion 
of viewpoint discrimination in Part III, Section C—a section the Ken-
nedy bloc did not join—covered only two paragraphs before Alito 
segued out by citing a list of right-to-offend cases, including Johnson 
and Falwell.106 It’s as if Alito tossed in a few sentences about view-
point discrimination as a sop to Kennedy, who engaged in a lengthy 
analysis of that problem. 
Perhaps most telling is the fact that Alito omitted any reference to 
viewpoint discrimination in announcing the Court’s judgment at the 
opening of the opinion. He wrote only that the disparagement clause 
“violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends 
a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned 
104  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
105  Id. at 26.
106  Cohen v. California is conspicuously missing from this list of cases.
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on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”107 For Alito, Tam 
was about protecting offensive expression from the forces of political 
correctness.
Contrast that with the second paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, which reads: “As the Court is correct to hold, [the dis-
paragement clause] constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form 
of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous 
constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on 
which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.”108 For Kennedy, Tam 
was about preventing viewpoint discrimination in the marketplace 
of ideas.
This may all seem like two sides of the same legal coin. I doubt, 
however, that Justice Kennedy thought so when he engaged in the 
kind of lengthy and thoughtful analysis of viewpoint discrimination 
that Justice Alito’s opinion lacked.
Faith in the Marketplace of Ideas 
Back in 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. imported the 
marketplace-of-ideas theory of free expression into First Amend-
ment jurisprudence in Abrams v. United States.109 Writing in dissent, 
Holmes contended that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.110
Nearly a century later, Justice Kennedy favorably invoked the 
marketplace metaphor in Tam to explain why viewpoint discrimi-
nation is wrong and why, in turn, the disparagement clause is 
107  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
108  Id. at 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109  250 U.S. 616 (1919).
110  Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional. “By mandating positivity, the law here might 
silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas,” Kennedy 
opined.111 
Similarly, Kennedy’s criticism of removing “certain ideas and per-
spectives from a broader debate” reflects the notion that the con-
summate marketplace of ideas is a forum for debating all ideas and 
perspectives. The participants in this ideal marketplace are also ra-
tional and thoughtful, with Kennedy confidently suggesting that an 
initial hostile reaction to a message “may prompt further reflection, 
leading to a more reasoned, more tolerant position.” Ultimately, 
Kennedy closed his concurrence with a deep bow to faith in market-
place discussion rather than to trust in the government:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to 
some portion of the public can be turned against minority 
and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First 
Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s 
benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial 
safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic 
society.112
Some, of course, will consider such assuredness in the mar-
ketplace of ideas hopelessly naïve. We live in an era in which in-
stantaneous outrage (not reason or reflection) rules in response to 
offending tweets and “free and open discussion” is replaced by often 
unhinged—albeit, certainly free and open—verbal confrontation. 
What’s more, marketplace competition of ideas hasn’t driven out the 
falsity that is fake news—the great political and journalistic panic of 
2016–17—and replaced it with the truth. Many would also argue the 
marketplace of ideas already is badly distorted by the forces of con-
centrated, corporate media ownership, so what’s the harm in a little 
government intervention when it comes to registering trademarks? 
But the Court’s continuing invocation of the metaphor is testa-
ment, against all else, that it is an aspirational model for which so-
ciety should strive and upon which the government should not en-
croach or interfere. It may be a flawed theory, but it clearly captures 
111  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112  Id. at 1769.
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why the government cannot jettison ideas and perspectives it dis-
dains from the hurly-burly of today’s speech environment.
Final Thoughts
Although the Court in Tam struck down the Lanham Act’s dispar-
agement clause, it did not address the constitutionality of another 
facet of the same statute that allows the PTO to deny registration 
to marks featuring “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”113 
This clause has been used by the PTO to reject registration for sexu-
ally themed trademarks such “1-800-JACK-OFF” and “JACK-OFF” 
for a dial-a-porn company,114 as well as the phrase “Cock Sucker” 
accompanying a drawing of a crowing rooster for a company 
selling—you guessed it—rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops.115 
Unpacking the phrase “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous mat-
ter” is important. Prohibiting registration for deceptive marks is not 
problematic because the First Amendment does not safeguard com-
mercial speech that is false or misleading. But refusing registration 
for immoral or scandalous marks is troubling, given the subjective, 
value-laden judgments regarding the meaning of those words. In 
particular, the PTO’s use of “scandalous” is often interchangeable 
with the term “vulgar,”116 which circles back to the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Cohen that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”117 
A facial challenge on void-for-vagueness grounds to the part of 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a) targeting immoral and scandalous marks thus might 
provide another route for further rolling back the PTO’s authority 
over offensive speech.118
113  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017).
114  In re Blvd. Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
115  In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
116  Megan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandal-
ous Trademarks, 33 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 321, 335 (2015) (noting that “[t]he term 
‘scandalous’ has been held to encompass matter that is merely ‘vulgar,’” and adding 
that “the Federal Circuit has held that dictionary definitions alone can be sufficient to 
establish scandalousness where multiple dictionaries indicate a word is vulgar and the 
applicant’s mark indicates the vulgar meaning of the word”).
117  403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
118  See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (calling it “a basic prin-
ciple of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined” such that they fail to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited”).
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court in Tam virtually teed up such 
a future challenge. That’s because Justice Alito, in a part of the opin-
ion joined by all of the justices except Thomas, dropped a footnote 
pointing out that “the PTO has acknowledged that the guidelines 
‘for determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are 
somewhat vague and the determination of whether a mark is scan-
dalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective one.’”119
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s current test for obscen-
ity is replete with moralistic terms such as “prurient interest” and 
“patently offensive.”120 Additionally, “prurient interest” is defined 
by the Court with the equally subjective and moralistic notion of 
“a shameful or morbid interest in sex.”121 And, as noted earlier, the 
Court recently dodged a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s 
problematic definition of indecency.122 In brief, the Court demon-
strates some tolerance for subjectivity and ambiguity when it comes 
to regulating sexual matters. Thus, whether a challenge to the PTO’s 
authority over immoral and scandalous marks would be successful 
with the Supreme Court is unclear, but Alito’s footnote in Tam cer-
tainly encourages the effort.
Although Tam addressed a federal statute, the Court’s ruling has 
direct implications for state trademark laws too. That’s because doz-
ens of state statutes also target disparaging trademarks and mirror 
the language of the federal disparagement clause struck down in 
Tam. For instance, Florida Statute § 495.021(b) allows Sunshine State 
officials to deny registration to any mark that “consists of or com-
prises matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, insti-
tutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.” Statutes in other populous states such as California and 
New York contain the same language.123 These laws are now ripe 
for First Amendment challenges, with Tam serving as precedent for 
holding them unconstitutional.
119  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756, n.5 (2017) (emphasis added) (quoting In re 
In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 USPQ 2d 1653, 1654 (TTAB 1990) (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
120  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
121  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
122  Supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
123  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14205 (2017); N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 360-a (Consol. 2017).
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Ultimately, from a free-speech perspective, there is much to praise 
about the ruling in Tam. It vindicates and reaffirms key First Amend-
ment principles regarding both offensive expression and viewpoint 
discrimination. It also rebuffs the government-speech doctrine in 
the realm of trademarks, while attempting to curb its expansion else-
where. Furthermore, facets of the opinions of Justices Alito, Thomas, 
and Kennedy collectively raise questions about the future of an inter-
mediate-scrutiny-based commercial speech doctrine. Additionally, 
Tam reinforces the Court’s continued respect for the marketplace of 
ideas. What’s more, Justice Alito came to the aid of offensive expres-
sion, while Justice Breyer didn’t stray off the beaten doctrinal path. 
That’s just about a First Amendment home run, with the unfortunate 
4-4 split among the justices regarding viewpoint discrimination the 
only item keeping the ball inside the fence for a triple.
